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In August 2015, Kosovo established the Specialist Chambers (SC) and the Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) with the mandate of prosecuting international and trans-
border crimes committed during and after the 1998^1999 armed conflict. This art-
icle examines the founding instruments of the SC and the SPO, the influence of
certain regional organizations in their creation and management, their organization,
jurisdiction, legal nature and the function they exercise within the international
legal system. The key question is whether the SC and the SPO may be included in
existing categories of judicial entities established to deal with international criminal
justice. The article concludes that they represent a regional variation of mixed crim-
inal tribunals.
1. Introductory Remarks: A Problem of Legal
Taxonomy
This article focuses on a number of legal problems raised by the establishment
of the Specialist Chambers (SC) and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) in
Kosovo. These were created by law in August 2015 and are entrusted with
bringing to trial those responsible for international crimes perpetrated in
Kosovo during and after the armed conflict that broke out in the late 1990s.
This article explores the features of the SC and the SPO, and seeks to answer
the question of whether they form a new category of judicial bodies acting in
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the field of international criminal justice or instead belong to a pre-existing
category, namely national, international or mixed criminal tribunals.
These are not mere labelling queries for the purposes of scholarly classifica-
tion. Several legal consequences flow from such a determination, such as,
inter alia: the identification of the entity (a state, an international organization
or the court itself) to which the judicial activity should be attributed for the
purposes of international law; the legal regime governing the court’s function-
ing; and the applicability or relevance of some specific rules of international
law (e.g. those on the immunity of state officials pursuant to customary
norms, or those on the relationship with the International Criminal Court
(ICC)).
For reasons I have discussed elsewhere,1 in tackling these issues one should
focus, first, on the legal nature of the relevant judicial body ç which can alter-
natively be domestic or international (Sections 6 and 7) ç and, second, on
the function such body exercises within the international legal order. Due to
the gravity and nature of international crimes, these entities typically function
to protect fundamental values of the international community as a whole.
However, it is to be assessed whether such protection amounts to an ‘enforce-
ment’ measure (i.e. exclusively aimed at implementing international criminal
law); and/or a ‘preventive’ measure (because the establishment of the judicial
body is meant to enable the territorial state to prosecute international crimes
which may be committed in its territory or by its nationals in the future); or
something else entirely (Section 8).
Furthermore, one should take into account the influence, interests and ob-
jectives of external actors (such as, in this case, the European Union (EU) and
the Council of Europe (CoE)) in creating and managing the judicial entity at
hand. This article contends that the SC and the SPO are just another step in
the direction of a ‘regionalization’of international criminal justice (Section 9).
However, in order to conceptualize the main normative features of the SC
and the SPO, we must first recall the process that led to their establishment
(Section 2), the role played by the said external actors in such establishment
(Section 3), their organization and jurisdiction (Section 4). This survey will
answer the question of whether the SC and the SPO ç which cannot be con-
sidered as two separate entities, but a single judicial body ç should be categor-
ized as a mixed criminal tribunal (Section 5).
2. The Creation of the SC and the SPO
The SC and the SPO were created by Law No. 05/L-053 (hereinafter, ‘the Law’),
adopted on 3 August 2015 by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, effective
as of 15 September 2015.2
1 See E. Cimiotta, I tribunali penali misti (Cedam, 2009), at 36 et seq., 331 et seq., 457 et seq.
2 Law No. 05/L-053 of 3 August 2015, on theSC and the SPO (available online at www.kuvendikosoves.
org, last visited 3 November 2015).
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The Law came as the result of a long and arduous decision-making process,
marked by a high level of EU involvement. It aims to ensure independent, fair,
secure and efficient criminal proceedings in response to allegations of serious
transborder and international crimes committed in Kosovo between 1 January
1998 and 31 December 2000.
On 3 August 2015, the Assembly also approved Constitutional Amendment
No. 24, which added a new Article 162 to the Kosovo Constitution. The latter
provides for the authority to create ç as new judicial organs within the do-
mestic judicial system ç the SC and the SPO, and sets the legal framework
for their organization, jurisdiction and functioning. According to Article
162(1), these aspects are regulated by Article 162 itself (paras 2^14)3 and by
the said Law.
Finally, on 15 April 2015, the Constitutional Court ç in reviewing the con-
stitutional compatibility of the proposed amendment, during its prior assess-
ment pursuant to Articles 113(9) and 144(3) Kosovo Constitution ç had given
leeway to Constitutional Amendment No. 24 by stating that it would not
undermine any of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution.4
3. The Contribution of the CoE and the EU to the
Creation of the SC and the SPO
The steps which led to the creation of the SC and the SPO involved with
separate functions and roles two regional organizations, namely the CoE and
the EU.
First, the plan to set up a special court in Kosovo grew from the allegations
contained in the Report ‘Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in
human organs in Kosovo’ released on 12 December 2010 by the Special
3 In particular, the Amendment affords procedural guarantees for those who are subject to the
jurisdiction of the SC and the SPO, requiring to uphold the protection enshrined within
Chapter II of the Constitution (Art. 162(2)). It grants to the SC and the SPO full legal personality
and all the necessary powers for their operation, judicial cooperation, assistance, witness pro-
tection, security, detention and the service of sentence outside of Kosovo. Before entering into
any international treaty with a third state relating to judicial cooperation, which would other-
wise require ratification under Art. 18 Kosovo Constitution, the SC are required to seek the ap-
proval of the Kosovo government (Art. 162(4)(5)). Moreover, according to the Amendment the
SC and the SPO may have a seat in Kosovo and a seat outside of Kosovo. Consistent with inter-
national law, any persons accused of crimes before the SC may be detained and transferred to
the SC sitting outside of Kosovo (Art. 162(7)(8)). Finally, the duration of the SC and the SPO is
set for a period of five years, unless notification of completion of the mandate occurs earlier
(Art. 162(13)(14)).
4 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo, judgment of 15 April 2015, Case No. K026/15
(available online at www.gjk-ks.org, last visited 3 November 2015) (hereinafter: ‘Constitutional
Court Judgment’).
The SC and the SPO in Kosovo 3 of 20
 at U
niversita' degli Studi Rom






Rapporteur for the CoE’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (here-
inafter: ‘Marty Report’).5
The Report was subsequently endorsed by the CoE’s ParliamentaryAssembly.
In its Report of 7 January 2011 (hereinafter: ‘CoE Report’), the Assembly out-
lined a number of specific allegations concerning serious crimes (such as orga-
nized crime, illegal detention, inhuman treatment and illicit trafficking in
human organs) perpetrated during and in the aftermath of the conflict, and
recommended that Kosovo investigate and adjudicate them.6 It stressed the
need for an absolutely uncompromising fight against impunity,7 and urged
the Kosovo administration to cooperate unconditionally with the EU Rule of
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)8 and with the Serbian authorities within the
procedural framework intended to address those crimes. In particular, it rec-
ommended that Kosovo start a serious and independent investigation into the
concrete and specific allegations of organ trafficking and secret detention cen-
tres, where inhuman treatment was purportedly inflicted by Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) militias on prisoners of Serbian and Albanian origin.9
It also recommended that all CoE Member States cooperate judicially to on-
going and future war crimes investigations upon request of the competent
EULEX and Serbian authorities.10
The CoE thus launched the process for the creation of the SC and the SPO
and for the judicial assistance by its Member States. Since 2011, the said allega-
tions have been investigated by the EULEX Special Investigative Task Force
(SITF) of the Republic of Kosovo’s Special Prosecution Office.
Then, it was the EU’s turn to intervene in the process. By establishing the SC
and the SPO, Kosovo not only followed the recommendations of the CoE
Report,11 but also complied with the obligations stemming from the interna-
tional agreement it reached with the EU through an exchange of letters. The
agreement was ratified by Law No. 04/L-274 of 23 April 2014 and is incorpo-
rated in this Law by reference in its Article 2.12 On 14 April 2014 the
President of the Republic of Kosovo addressed a letter to the EU High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, demanding to end
EULEX mandate on 15 June 2016. Most importantly, the letter invited the EU
to assist Kosovo in setting up and operating a judicial body ç to be created
within the Kosovo judicial system ç to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate
allegations originating from SITF’s work.13 The letter suggested the creation of
5 Available online at http://www.assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/ajdoc462010prov.pdf
(last visited 3 November 2015).
6 Council of Europe, ParliamentaryAssembly, Report Doc.12462,7 January 2011 (available online
at www.assembly.coe.int, last visited 3 November 2015).
7 Ibid., x14.
8 On EULEX, see infra, Section 9.
9 CoE Report, supra note 6, xx19.5.1^19.5.3.
10 Ibid., x19.6.
11 To which both the Constitutional Amendment No. 24 (Art.162(1)) and the Law (Art.1) expressly
refer.
12 Available online at www.kuvendikosoves.org (last visited 3 November 2015).
13 The texts of this and of the following letter are attached to the Law No. 04/L-274, Ibid.
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new dedicated chambers covering all levels of the court system, which might
operate abroad due to the proceedings’ sensitivity and whose structure would
be managed by EULEX foreign staff only. To this end, Kosovo sought to adopt
appropriate legislation. The President further stressed that EULEX would be
delegated all necessary powers, under Article 20 Kosovo Constitution, to oper-
ate the chambers and the prosecution office, including the appointment of
judges (under Articles 65, 84, 108 and 114 Kosovo Constitution) and prosecu-
tors (under Articles 84 and 110 Kosovo Constitution). Notwithstanding the
scheduled end date for EULEX, she concluded, the mandate to operate the SC
and the SPO would continue until such time as Kosovo is notified by the
Council of the EU.
In her reply of 14 April 2014, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy accepted the invitation, confirming that the SITF’s work
and any related judicial proceedings would continue until such time as the
Council of the EU notifies Kosovo that the investigation and the proceedings
are terminated.
As a result, the EU adopted Council Decision 2014/685/CFSP of 29 September
2014, amending the Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the
creation of EULEX. It inserted a provision requiring EULEX to support re-
located judicial proceedings and to prosecute and adjudicate criminal charges
arising from the investigation of allegations contained in the Marty Report.14
The Law on the establishment of the SC and the SPO was adopted precisely
to enable the international agreement between Kosovo and the EU (Article
1(2)). Hence, they are intended to work within the framework of Kosovo’s legal
and judicial system, but with a view to implementing obligations and recom-
mendations stemming from regional intergovernmental organizations.
4. The Organization and Jurisdiction of the SC and the
SPO: Reflecting Some Normative Features of Mixed
Criminal Tribunals
The SC and SPO have the organization and jurisdiction of a special criminal
court, what creates a problem with regard to their legal classification. In
order to address this problem, the present article will compare them with
other tribunals acting in the field of international criminal justice.
With respect to organizational considerations, pursuant to Articles 3 and 24
of the Law, dedicated Chambers are attached to each level of the Kosovar judi-
cial system: the Basic Court of Pristina, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Court.15
14 Council Decision 2014/685/CFSP of 29 September 2014, amending the Council Joint Action
2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, Official Journal of the
European Union, L 284/51, 30 September 2014.
15 In accordance with Art. 49 of the Law, the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court shall
be the final authority for the interpretation of the Constitution as it relates to the subject-matter
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Their composition changes depending on the circumstances: they may sit in
panels of three judges (with a reserve judge), but judges may act individually
when required by the Law, e.g. when performing pre-trial functions
(Article 25).
The judges shall only be physically present at the SC seat ç at the request of
the SC President ç to exercise such functions which require them to be pre-
sent. Where possible, and as determined by the President, judicial functions
may be fulfilled remotely (Article 26(2)). This is essentially justified by security
and/or financial concerns. However, it is unclear whether an entire trial could
be conducted remotely, which would be a novelty in international criminal
justice.
The judges’ independence is ensured byArticles 27(1) and 31. They have the
authority and responsibility to perform judicial functions for the proceedings
to which they are assigned and remain in their post until what comes first be-
tween the end of a four-year term and the completion of the phase to which
they are assigned (Article 30).
Article 26 establishes a roster of ‘international judges’ ç i.e. with national-
ities other than the Kosovar one ç from which to assign judges to specific
cases. In fact, Article 27 states that they must possess the qualifications
required ‘in their respective states’ for appointment to the highest judicial of-
fices,16 and the letter of the President of Kosovo to the EU High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy refers to foreign staff only (Section 3).
The appointment procedure is led by an ‘independent selection panel’ com-
prised of three ‘international members’, at least two of which shall be ‘interna-
tional judges with substantial international criminal experience’ (Article 28).
Following an assessment of the qualified candidates, the panel finalizes a list
of those it recommends for a position as judge. The list is forwarded to the
Head of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy Mission (HCSDP), who,
understandably, will serve as the Head of EULEX as long as the mission exists.
The HCSDP is in charge of appointing selected candidates as judges and pla-
cing them on the roster for the duration of the SC activities. Based on the selec-
tion panel’s recommendations, the HCSDP also appoints the SC President and
Vice-President (Article 32), who are responsible for the judicial administration.
jurisdiction and activity of the SC and the SPO. In accordance with Art. 113(7) Kosovo
Constitution, individuals, including the accused and the victims, are entitled to make referrals
to the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court in relation to alleged violations by the
SC or the SPO of their individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, provided
that all legal remedies have been exhausted. In accordance with Art. 113(8) Kosovo
Constitution, a pre-trial judge or a panel of the SC may refer questions of constitutional com-
patibility of a law to the Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court when the question
arises in a judicial proceeding and the decision in the case depends on the compatibility of
that law.
16 They shall have ‘established competence in criminal law and procedure or relevant parts of
international law and constitutional law as appropriate, with extensive judicial, prosecutorial
or defence experience in international or domestic criminal proceedings’ (Art. 27(1)). It means
that at least some of them should have worked for an international or a mixed criminal
tribunal.
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The SPO (Article 35), which shall take over the mandate and personnel of
the SITF, is an independent office for the investigation and prosecution of of-
fences within the jurisdiction of the SC. It acts independently from the SC and
other prosecution authorities in Kosovo. It cannot seek or receive instructions
from any government or from any other source and is composed of the
Specialist Prosecutor, other Prosecutors, police and such other qualified staff
as it may be required. Pursuant to Article 35(6), upon the SPO’s establishment
the SITF Lead Prosecutor is appointed as the Specialist Prosecutor. If he or
she leaves the post at any time, a replacement is appointed by the HCSDP
after consideration of suitably qualified applicants (Article 35(7)). The
Specialist Prosecutor serves for a four-year term. Prosecutors and other office
holders are also appointed by the HCSDP, upon recommendation by the
Specialist Prosecutor (Article 35(9)).
The Registry (Article 34) includes a Defence Office, a Victims Participation
Office, aWitness Protection and Support Office, a Detention Management Unit
and an Ombudsperson’s Office. It is responsible for the administration and ser-
vicing of the SC and all necessary and affiliated functions. It is composed of a
Registrar and other staff as required. The Registrar may issue any necessary in-
struction for the purpose of administration and is independent in the perform-
ance of his or her functions. The Registrar serves for a four-year term and is
appointed by the HCSDP (Article 34(4)(5)).
Articles 6,7, 8, and 9 define the subject-matter, temporal, territorial and per-
sonal jurisdiction of the SC, respectively. Subject-matter jurisdiction covers
international crimes (crimes against humanity, Article 13; and war crimes,
Article 14) related to the allegations contained in the CoE Report. It also
covers specific offences under Kosovo Law (Article 15), and specific offences
under the Kosovo Criminal Code of 2012, where they relate to official proceed-
ings and officials of the SC. Temporal jurisdiction covers conducts that took
place between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000. Territorial jurisdiction
extends to crimes committed or commenced in the territory of Kosovo.
Personal jurisdiction only includes natural people, specifically, nationals of
Kosovo or of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or individuals who
perpetrated crimes within the SC subject-matter jurisdiction against nationals
of Kosovo or FRY, wherever those crimes were committed.
Hence, the SC’s organization and jurisdiction ç set out in the Law ç are
mixed. The latter concerns both domestic and international offences committed
during an armed conflict with both internal and international features: on the
one hand, the non-international armed conflict between the KLA and the
Serbian government; on the other, the international armed conflict between a
group of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Member States and Serbia.
Moreover, the SC and SPO are composed of foreign judges, prosecutors and per-
sonnel, appointed by an entity that is external to Kosovo’s domestic authorities
(the HCSDP), following an internationally driven selection process led by foreign
nationals. However, they operate within the Kosovar judicial system.
Due to the coexistence of the mentioned elements, the SC and the SPO
cannot be perceived either as fully domestic or fully international criminal
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tribunals. Accordingly, the question arises whether they should be considered
to be a mixed criminal tribunal. Therefore, we must understand what a mixed
criminal tribunal is and then assess whether ç and, eventually, to what
extent ç the SC and SPO can be included in this category.
5. Mixed Criminal Tribunals as a ‘Functional’ Category
In my view, mixed criminal tribunals (also known as hybrid or internationa-
lized criminal tribunals) fall into a ‘functional’ rather than a ‘normative’ cat-
egory.17 It is the function they materially exercise within the international
legal system to bring them together. In fact, their normative features (the fact
that they are composed of local and foreign judges, prosecutors and personnel;
and their authority to prosecute both national and international crimes under
both national and international criminal law) are insufficient to warrant their
inclusion in an independent category. The balance between local and foreign
components is different in each mixed tribunal.
However, all mixed criminal tribunals are physically and (more importantly)
legally based on a permanent basis in the areas in which the offences within
their jurisdiction occurred.18 This circumstance may prove convenient on the
investigative and judicial front in the short run, as well as on the normative, in-
stitutional, and socio-political one in the long run. All such areas were placed
under a United Nations (UN) provisional administration or UN peacebuilding
operations: the UN was thus entrusted with exercising public functions vis-a' -
vis local societies. Moreover, mixed tribunals were established at the end of in-
ternal armed conflicts (thus, they were embedded in post-conflict scenarios,
where the problem of state reconstruction arises) as a result of the interaction
between the UN and local governments. This interaction allowed national gov-
ernments to promote the needs and the expectations of aggrieved populations.
Therefore, ideally such tribunals are meant to influence national reconciliation
processes; they are an extension of UN post-conflict peacebuilding activities
in the criminal and judicial sectors.19
17 See Cimiotta, supra note 1, at 458^550.
18 Except for single trials exceptionally and occasionally relocated abroad due to security con-
cerns, as in the Taylor case before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This trial was transferred
from Freetown toThe Hague. A solution, however, that pushed the Court away from the victims
and could thus undermine the process of national reconciliation, namely: one the purposes of
the Court. For a similar criticism, see P. Mcauliffe, ‘Transitional Justice in Transit: Why
Transferring a Special Court for Sierra Leone Trial to The Hague Defeats the Purposes of
Hybrid Tribunals’, 55 Netherlands International Law Review (2008) 365^393.
19 See also P.K. Mendez, ‘The New Wave of Hybrid Tribunals: A Sophisticated Approach to
Enforcing International Humanitarian Law or an Idealistic Solution with Empty Promises?’, 20
Criminal Law Forum (2009) 53^95; L. Raub, ‘Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International
Criminal Justice’, 41 NewYork University Journal of International Law and Politics (2009)
1013^1053; C. Ragni, I tribunali penali internazionalizzati. Fondamento, giurisdizione e diritto appli-
cabile (Giuffre' , 2012), at 25 et seq., 33 et seq.; C. Romano, ‘Mixed Criminal Tribunals’, in R.
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To summarize, mixed criminal tribunals form a category of their own for two
reasons.20 On the one hand, they are, as a formal matter, internal to their re-
spective territorial states. Unlike international criminal tribunals (namely, the
ICC, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)), their activity has
legal effect primarily upon individuals (at the inter-individual level) rather
than upon states (at the international level). Mixed criminal tribunals avail
themselves of national law enforcement authorities to carry out judicial police
action and collect evidence within the boundaries of the state in which they
are located, which is also the state where the crimes were committed. In this
respect they act, like every domestic tribunal, against individuals, who are
thus under their authority. A tribunal’s judicial activity can directly affect an
individual’s legal standing, without any state mediation, like any domestic
public institutions. The legal effects of such activity are confined to the territor-
ial state’s national legal order, to whom the activity is formally referable.
International criminal tribunals are different, as they are not technically ‘terri-
torially based’, not even in the state in which they have their headquarters.
They do not belong to any state and do not operate within any domestic judi-
cial system. They act within the international legal order and under interna-
tional law and, as such, their activity is not legally attributable to any state.
Such activity is principally addressed to states, rather than individuals, at
least as long as the tribunals do not have suspects in their custody. At that
point individuals come within the tribunal’s authority and their legal position
is directly affected by the tribunal’s activity, within its own legal order, until a
judgment is issued. Pursuant to international criminal tribunals’ statutes (and
unlike provided in mixed criminal tribunals’ statutes),21 states are bound to co-
operate in the investigation and prosecution of crimes under those interna-
tional criminal tribunals’ jurisdiction and to respect their decisions and
judgments (e.g. on matters like ne bis in idem and enforcement of sentences).
Since that they do not directly control any law enforcement authority, interna-
tional criminal tribunals must rely on states to identify, apprehend and detain
individuals, collect documents, compel attendance of witnesses and enforce
sentences of imprisonment ç even when the activity must be undertaken in
the host state’s territory. Taking into account that criminal proceedings can
only start in presence of the accused, international criminal tribunals must
wait until the relevant state executes a request for arrest and transfer (except
of course in the event of voluntary surrender). From a normative perspective,
international criminal tribunals’ statutes and decisions are not directly binding
on individuals before their first appearance in court and after final conviction
Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press,
2013).
20 See Cimiotta, supra note 1.
21 Mixed criminal tribunals may seek a third state’s assistance only based on ad hoc international
agreements, very much like states seek international cooperation in criminal matters between
themselves.
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or acquittal. During such time, individuals are not subject to the authority of
the international criminal tribunals; rather, they remain subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the relevant state, to which the tribunals’ acts are addressed.
Consequently, the legal standing of individuals is only indirectly affected by
the international criminal tribunals’ judicial activity, i.e. through state medi-
ation. The legal effects of such activity are principally contained within the
international legal order (and not within the national legal order of individual
states), because they primarily affect states’ legal positions.22
On the other hand, mixed criminal tribunals are expected to carry out a par-
ticular function within the international legal system; a function which aims
at protecting fundamental values of the international community as a whole,
both as a ‘preventive’ and as an ‘enforcement’ measure. This function is per-
formed for the purposes of UN post-conflict peacebuilding activities. The estab-
lishment of a mixed tribunal does not only seek to implement international
criminal law in view of restoring the legal order undermined by crimes
(which is typically a function of international criminal tribunals), but, more
significantly, it also introduces new structural and normative elements into
the territorial state’s institutional and legal systems. These elements include
an increased judicial capacity concerning the investigation and prosecution of
international crimes, and the incorporation of substantial and procedural
international criminal rules into domestic law. In other words, the creation of
a mixed criminal tribunal is intended to produce long-term effects on the terri-
torial state, at both the normative and the institutional level, thus enabling it
pro futuro to adjudicate international crimes on its own.
Based on the aforementioned parameters, mixed criminal tribunals include
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK)’s Regulation 64/2000 Panels and the Special Panels for Serious
Crimes in East-Timor.23 The said definition of mixed criminal tribunals ex-
cludes the Iraqi High Criminal Court, the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Extraordinary African
Chambers in the Courts of Senegal (EAC), despite all of them having ç to a
certain extent ç mixed organization and jurisdiction.24 In fact, such tribunals
have not been involved in UN peacebuilding processes, and do not aim at fos-
tering national reconciliation in the states where the crimes were committed.
22 This is one of the main reasons why the legal nature of the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal was not international stricto sensu, but domestic. The Tribunal was a joint body of
the Occupying Powers. It exercised the respective judicial powers of these states, since they
gained full public authority over German territory following its debellatio. See B.V.A. Ro« ling,
‘The Law of War and the National Jurisdiction since 1945’, 100 Recueil des Cours de l’Acade¤ mie
de droit international de La Haye (1960) 323^456, at 356; C. Tomuschat, ‘International Courts
and Tribunals’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law (North-Holland,
1995) 1108^1115, at 1109.
23 The relevant elements are too many and diverse to allow a detailed analysis to be carried out
here. See, extensively, Cimiotta, supra note 1, at 339^409, 427^550.
24 Ibid., at 551^567.
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They fulfil a different function and have different goals. The Iraqi High
Criminal Court was created by the Occupying Powers in Iraq, with no UN in-
volvement, to prosecute (and convict) the leaders of the defeated Iraqi regime
as quickly as possible.25 The War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was a sort of ‘extension’ of the ICTY into the Bosnian judicial system and was
created for the purposes of its ‘completion strategy’.26 The Special Tribunal for
Lebanon was not established in a post-conflict scenario to prosecute those al-
legedly responsible for international crimes and was imposed upon (and not
accepted by) Lebanon by the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter.27 The EAC were created by the African Union (AU) and the
state having custody of the accused (again, without any UN involvement),
with no participation by the territorial state and no long-term spillover effects
in its legal and judicial system. The defendant was allegedly responsible for
crimes committed during a conflict that had erupted in another country
(Chad).28 These tribunals do not belong to any general category; each of them
is a single, specific exemplar of judicial body.
The SC and the SPO may now be examined in light of the mentioned
parameters.
6. The Internal Legal Nature of the SC and the SPO
For reasons beyond the scope of this inquiry,29 the principal criterion in iden-
tifying the legal nature of a criminal judicial body seems to be the nature
of the legal order ç domestic or international ç where the effects of its
activity primarily take place. These effects ç in terms of legal obligations,
coercive measures and police operations ç may alternatively occur at the
inter-individual level, within the domestic legal order (as in the case of national
tribunals); or at the international level, within the international legal order
(as in the case of international tribunals). It depends on the nature ç domestic
(individual) or international (state) ç of the subject whose legal position is dir-
ectly affected by the relevant judicial body (Section 5).
25 J. Alvarez, ‘Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony’, 2 Journal of International Criminal
Justice (JICJ) (2004) 319^329; M. Scharf, ‘Is It International Enough? A Critique of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal in Light of the Goals of International Justice’, 2 JICJ (2004) 330^337; D. Zolo,
‘The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?’, 2 JICJ (2004) 313^318.
26 W. Burke-White, ‘The Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court
of Bosnia & Herzegovina’, 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2008) 279^351.
27 F. Me¤ gret, ‘A Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN Security Council and the Emancipation of
International Criminal Justice’, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) (2008) 485^512; W.
Schabas, ‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a ‘Tribunal of an International Character’
Equivalent to an ‘International Criminal Court’?’ 21 LJIL (2008) 513^528.
28 E. Cimiotta, ‘The First Steps of the Extraordinary African Chambers: A New Mixed Criminal
Tribunal?’ 13 JICJ (2015) 177^197.
29 See, more extensively, Cimiotta, supra note 1, at 47^122.
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The legal consequences of the activity carried out by the SC and the SPO are
meant to principally take place in Kosovo, at the inter-individual rather than
at the international level, since their activity is confined to Kosovo’s legal
system. The relationship with persons under their jurisdiction, by means of
local law enforcement authorities, seems to confirm this view.Where appropri-
ate, the SC and the SPO can interact with individuals for the purposes of judi-
cial police action and evidence collection. Their entitlement to engage in
police operations directly impacts the individuals’ juridical domain. Unlike
international criminal tribunals, the SC and the SPO do not need to obtain
the assistance of the local government to accomplish law enforcement activ-
ities within the territory where they are located. Rather, like any domestic
criminal tribunal, they are institutionally linked to local police forces.
Moreover, the SC and SPO’s statute does not impose duties of assistance or co-
operation upon third states. Thus, it would be inaccurate to contend that their
activity produces legal effects upon states other than Kosovo, as if they were
embedded in the international legal order and, consequently, were interna-
tional in nature. Rather, the SC and the SPO belong to Kosovo, to which their
activity is formally referable.30 They are integrated into the existing structure
of the justice system, operate within the existing domestic legal framework
and act under Kosovo’s sovereignty, as was held by the Constitutional Court in
its judgment of April 2015.31
The Court found that the prospective establishment of the SC and the SPO
conformed with Article 103(7) Kosovo Constitution. This provision authorizes
the establishment of ‘specialized courts’, as long as is necessary and pursuant
to law, namely ‘court[s] with a specifically defined scope of jurisdiction, and
which remain . . .within the existing framework of the judicial system of the
Republic of Kosovo and operate . . . in compliance with its principles’.32
The SC and the SPO are established by a Kosovo law, which regulates their
organization, powers and jurisdiction. It prevails over any other conflicting
law or regulation in Kosovo (Article 3(4)) and provides an organic and compre-
hensive normative setting. Moreover, the SC and the SPO act in accordance
with the Constitution and domestic law (Article 3(2)). The Rules of Procedure
and Evidence for the conduct of proceedings before the SC shall be adopted
by the judges, who shall be guided by the Kosovo Criminal Procedure Code,
provided their consistency with the Law (Article 19).
30 Recently, a completely different approach was adopted, ex multis, byW. Schabas, ‘International
Criminal Courts’, in C. Romano, K. Alter and Y. Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
International Adjudication (Oxford University Press, 2014) 205^224. He stresses that interna-
tional criminal courts are identified by one or more of the following features: ‘establishment
by treaty or by resolution of an international organization, subject-matter jurisdiction over
international crimes, and significant international representation among the judiciary and
other judicial officers’ (at 208). However, it seems rather problematic to apply this test to the
SC and the SPO, as well as to other special criminal tribunals (such as the EAC,
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Iraqi High Criminal Court and
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East-Timor).
31 Constitutional Court Judgment, supra note 4, xx 46, 59, 68, 71.
32 Ibid., x 43.
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Specific provisions of the Law offer more hints to the SC and the SPO domes-
tic nature. Article 53 ç included in Chapter VII (Interaction with Kosovo
Courts and Entities) ç equates the SC and the SPO to all other Kosovo courts
and prosecutors with regard to the relationship with law enforcement authori-
ties.33 Pursuant to Article 53(2), orders issued by the SC enjoy the same legal
force and effect of orders issued by any other Kosovo judge. Again, Article
53(3) establishes that arrest warrants issued by the SC have the same force
and effect as those issued by any other Kosovo judge.34 This also applies to for-
feiture of property, proceeds or assets, pursuant to Article 53(4)(5).35
This normative setting is further enriched by those provisions of the Law
which regulate prosecutorial and judicial functions and powers.
The SPO can avail itself of police forces and other domestic law enforcement
authorities, like any other Kosovar prosecutor. Pursuant to Article 35, the SPO
has authority to investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of
the SC, with a wide array of related tasks and activities.36 In carrying them
out, the SPO will, as appropriate, be assisted by Kosovar public entities. The
police embedded within the SPO have the authority to exercise the powers
granted ordinarily to the Kosovo police, consistently with the policies and pro-
cedures set forth in the Law (Article 35(3)). Similar provisions are contained
in Article 38, which governs investigations and the preparation of indictments.
Similar powers are attributed to the pre-trial judge, who has the authority to
review indictments, to rule on preliminary motions (including challenges to
the indictment and to jurisdiction), and issue any necessary order to ensure
that the case is prepared properly and expeditiously for trial (Article 39).37
These same powers are also granted to the trial panel, which is responsible
33 Art. 53(1) reads: ‘all entities and persons in Kosovo shall co-operate with the Specialist
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office and shall comply without undue delay with any
request for assistance or an order or decision issued by Specialist Chambers or Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office’.
34 Art. 53(3) further reads: ‘[w]here such a warrant of arrest is executed, the arresting police offi-
cer shall transfer the person arrested into the custody of the Specialist Chambers’.
35 In fact, according to Art. 53(4)(5), ‘[p]roperty, or the proceeds of the sale of real property or,
where appropriate, the sale of other property, which is obtained in Kosovo as a result of its en-
forcement of a judgement of the Specialist Chambers shall be transferred to custody and con-
trol of the Specialist Chambers without delay’.
36 The following list is provided byArt. 35: ‘requesting the presence of and questioning suspects,
victims and witnesses, and if necessary summonsing these persons; collecting and examining
information and evidence; conducting on-site investigations; seeking the co-operation of any
State or inter-governmental, international or national organisation . . . , and entering into any
arrangements or agreements as may be necessary in that regard; . . . ordering the arrest of a
person during the investigative stage for a period of no more than forty eight (48) hours’.
37 Art. 39 reads: ‘[t]he Pre-Trial Judge may, at the request of the Specialist Prosecutor, issue such
orders and warrants for the arrest and transfer of persons to the Specialist Chambers and any
other orders as may be required for the conduct of the investigation and for the preparation of
a fair and expeditious trial . . . . . . .The Pre-Trial Judge may, where necessary, [issue] temporary
freezing orders, temporary confiscation orders or other temporary measures’.
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for the conduct of trial proceedings, thus ensuring that they are fair and ex-
peditious (Article 40).38
Even the Registry can make use of domestic authorities for the performance
of its mandate (Article 34). It can exercise the same powers as the Kosovo
police under domestic legislation.39
The Law also regulates the detention by order of or on behalf of the SC or the
SPO. Detention facilities are managed by the Registry (Article 41). Should the
proceedings be partially or completely relocated to a host state under Article
3, the detention facilities would be placed in the vicinity. In this regard the
Registrar, guided by the Kosovo Criminal Procedure Code, adopts the ‘Rules
on Detention, Complaints and Disciplinary Procedures for the Detention
Facilities’.40 Hence, the detention system is fully internal, even when detention
actually takes place outside of Kosovo.
Furthermore, the SC and the SPO can call a witness if, likely, he or she may
have information about a crime, the perpetrator or important circumstances
relevant to the proceedings (Article 42). Any person present in Kosovo called
as a witness has a duty to respond to the summons and testify, unless other-
wise provided in either the Law or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.41 If re-
quested by the SC, other Kosovar courts and officials are required to assist in
the service or enforcement of witness summonses.
Finally, as said, the Law does not impose any duty of assistance or cooper-
ation upon states or international organizations. Pursuant to Article 55 ç
included in Chapter VIII (Co-operation and Assistance with Other States,
Organisations and Entities) ç the SC and the SPO may request the assistance
and cooperation from states other than Kosovo, international organizations,
and other entities as necessary for the exercise of their functions. To this end,
Article 4 allows the SC, the SPO and the Registry to enter into such arrange-
ments as necessary or to utilize any mutual legal assistance agreements
entered into by Kosovo.
38 Art. 40 reads: ‘the Trial Panel may, as necessary: exercise any functions or powers of the
Pre-Trial Judge referred to in Article 39; . . . require the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and production of documents and other evidence . . . order the production of evidence in add-
ition to that already collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties’.
39 According to Art. 34(10), the Registry ‘may also rely on the assistance of police in Kosovo, to
carry out orders or serve documents on behalf of the Specialist Chambers. The Specialist
Chambers officers of the court shall have the authority and responsibility to exercise powers
given to Kosovo Police under Kosovo law’.
40 According to Art. 41(12), in addition to detention, the following coactive measures may be
ordered by the SC to ensure the presence of the accused during proceedings, to prevent re-
offending, or to ensure successful conduct of trial proceedings: summons; order for arrest;
and, provided that the accused consents to attend proceedings by video-teleconference, bail
with release in Kosovo, house detention in Kosovo, promise not to leave the place of current
residence in Kosovo, prohibition on approaching specific places or persons, attendance at
police station or other venue in Kosovo, diversion.
41 The compulsory character or the summonses is demonstrated by the rules which apply in case
they are disregarded. Pursuant to Art. 42(7)(8), the judges may impose coactive measures ç
namely, fines and even imprisonment ç against those who refuse to appear or to give
testimony.
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As to the service of prison sentences ç an issue which is strictly linked to
judicial assistance ç Article 57 follows a similar approach. It allows the SC
and the Registry to enter into arrangements with states which have expressed
their willingness to accept within their territory the service of detention sen-
tences issued by the SC. Should such an arrangement be reached, once the
judgment becomes final, the SC may order the transfer of the convict accord-
ingly. The conditions of imprisonment will be governed by the law of the state
of enforcement, subject to the SC’s supervision (Article 50). Only the SC can
alter the duration of the sentence, either through pardon or commutation
(Article 51).
7. The Entitlement to Apply International Law: No
Bearing on the Domestic Nature of the SC and the
SPO
The domestic nature of the SC and the SPO is not called into question by their
power to apply customary international law (Article 12). The international
nature of any applicable law does not per se entail the international nature of
a court. It is widely understood that, under certain circumstances, domestic
courts may give direct application to international law (compatibly with their
Constitutions and with the self-executing character of the international rule
to be applied). This does not transform them into international courts. In
Kosovo, for instance, the direct applicability and primacy over domestic law of
customary international law (and of certain international agreements on
human rights) is already prescribed by Articles 19(2) and 22 of the
Constitution. Obviously, these provisions bind all judges, prosecutors, institu-
tions and public authorities in the country.
The same reasoning can be applied to Article 3(3), which allows judges ç in
determining the content and scope of applicable customary norms ç to rely
on international criminal tribunals’ jurisprudence. This link is insufficient to
transform the SC into an international tribunal. It does not place them into
the purportedly existing international criminal judicial system, but merely en-
ables them to be assisted by such tribunals’ practice, possibly because of the lat-
ter’s extensive and comprehensive nature. This modus operandi is typical of
any national court. National judicial practice is replete with references to judg-
ments and decisions concerning international crimes and forms of individual
responsibility issued by international criminal tribunals.
Some evidence in support of this contention stems from Article 44 of the
Law. In determining the punishment to be imposed on a person found guilty
of an international crime, the SC are guided by domestic law. In particular,
they must take into account the penalties provided for the same crime under
Kosovo law applicable at the time of commission, as well as any subsequent
more lenient penalty.
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8. The Regional Dimension of the SC and the SPO
Notwithstanding their domestic nature, the SC and the SPO have regional di-
mensions, and are entrenched in regional backgrounds, distinguishing them
from purely national judicial bodies. Their establishment satisfies the need to
comply with international obligations vis-a' -vis the EU and recommendations
issued by the CoE. As it has been already remarked, these legal bases can be
found in Article 1 of the Law (Section 3).
Moreover, the international (European) nature of the institution endowed
with the power to appoint judges, prosecutors and personnel (the HCSDP) is a
clear manifestation of foreign authority over the SC and the SPO, and a signifi-
cant component of its regional dimension (Section 4).
Likewise, pursuant to Article 52 of the Law, the status, privileges and immu-
nities granted to the offices and personnel of EULEX under the Law of 20
February 2008 relating to the Status, Immunities and Privileges of Diplomatic
and Consular Mission and Personnel in the Republic of Kosovo are extended
to the premises, property, documents and personnel of the SC and SPO, as
well as to counsels, experts and witnesses.42 Accordingly, SC and SPO person-
nel act in Kosovo as if they were foreign personnel entrusted with public func-
tions. This additional link with EULEX, in terms of legal status of their office
in Kosovar territory, emphasizes again their regional dimension.
Moreover, according to Article 63 of the Law, the SC and the SPO budget is
not provided by Kosovo. Pursuant to Article 61, the SC and the SPO own their
archives and maintain them in a dedicated repository outside of Kosovo.
Article 62 takes security and privacy concerns into account and demands
that documents, papers, records and archives of the SC, the SPO and the
Registry are not to be considered public documents of Kosovo.
This international dimension is further demonstrated by the legal personal-
ity and powers the SC and the SPO have in their relationship with other states
and international organizations for the purposes of fulfilling their mandate
(Article 4). In particular, one should consider the SC’s treaty-making powers
concerning foreign cooperation, judicial assistance (Article 55), privileges and
immunities (Article 56) and the service of sentences (Article 57). The prospect
of having a seat in a host state also points in the same direction. Article 59 re-
quires an agreement between Kosovo and the host state. These provisions, as
a whole, endow the SC and the SPO with an international standing that do-
mestic judicial bodies normally do not enjoy.
42 Art. 52 reads: ‘[t]he premises, property, funds, assets, archives and records of the Specialist
Chambers, the Registry and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, wherever located and by whom-
soever held, shall be inviolable and immune from search, seizure, requisition, confiscation, ex-
propriation, public access or any other form of interference whether by executive,
administrative, judicial or legislative action. The Specialist Chambers, its principals, judges
and staff shall not be subjected by the government or authorities of Kosovo or any other
entity or person in Kosovo to any measure or action that may impact the free and independent
exercise of their functions under this Law’.
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Similar provisions are enshrined in Article 3(6)(7). The SC may enter into
special arrangements for testimony or appearances through alternative
means at the judges’ discretion. The Law also regulates the procedure to be
followed for a change of venue.43
It seems unlikely that states other than European states might be
prone to enter in similar agreements. After all, this would be one of the CoE-
recommended forms of judicial assistance that its Member States may take
(Section 3). This, again, shows the regional dimension of the SC and the SPO.
9. The Function Exercised by the SC and the SPO
within the International Legal Order
The SC and the SPO represent a step forward for the process of ‘regionalization’
currently underway in the field of international criminal justice. This process
was formally inaugurated by the EAC. They were set up to give effect to the
international agreement of August 2012 between Senegal and the AU, with
the mandate of prosecuting the former Chadian dictator, Hisse¤ ne Habre, for
international crimes allegedly committed in Chad more than 20 years earlier.44
However, unlike the EAC ç which is part of the assistance provided by a re-
gional organization (the AU) to one of its Member States (Senegal), in order to
prosecute crimes committed by foreigners in another Member State (Chad) ç
the SC and the SPO are part of the assistance provided by a regional organiza-
tion (EU) to a non-Member State (Kosovo), in order to prosecute crimes perpe-
trated in its territory by its nationals. Moreover, the process which led to their
establishment was initiated by another regional organization (CoE) of which
Kosovo is not a member; the other states most strictly connected to the of-
fences (Albania and Serbia) are also not members of the EU.
The EU’s participation seems aimed at creating the factual and legal pre-
conditions for Kosovo’s future admission into the EU, namely the restoration
and reinforcement of stability and rule of law in Kosovo, with possible positive
consequences in the whole region.45 In this sense, the SC and the SPO may be
perceived as a means of ensuring European internal security, given that they
43 For reasons of security or proper administration of justice, the President of the SC, the
Specialist Prosecutor, the Specialist Counsel or the Victims’ Counsel may invoke a change of
venue to the host state of a trial, any part of a trial or any particular stage or stages of the crim-
inal process (Art. 3(8)). Accordingly, the Specialist Prosecutor, the Specialist Counsel, the
Victims’ Counsel or any other party or person with standing to do so under the Law may file
any document and motion at the new seat. In all these cases, the President of the SC is required
to issue an administrative decision relocating the proceedings, or any part or phase thereof, to
the host state and shall order all necessary steps to give effect to this decision.
44 See, extensively, S.Williams,‘The ExtraordinaryAfrican Chambers in the Senegalese Courts. An
African Solution to an African Problem?’, 11 JICJ (2013) 1139^1160.
45 On the EU’s role as an actor in post-conflict scenarios, see S. Blockmans, J.Wouters and T. Ruys
(eds),The European Union and Peacebuilding (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010).
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are tasked with prosecuting KLA leaders who are allegedly responsible for
heinous crimes.
Moreover, the EU’s participation may strengthen Kosovo’s claim to statehood,
as an effective and independent governmental entity. Such participation
seems to be part of an internationally driven state-building process, which
aims at the reconstruction and strengthening of governance institutions
within a territory torn by armed conflict and civil strife.46
In fact, EULEX’s role in prosecuting organized and transborder crime in
Kosovo has proven inadequate, especially taking into account that those who
allegedly bore the greatest responsibility are now senior political leaders.47
The above-referenced letter of the President of Kosovo seems to support this
line of reasoning. She conceived Kosovo’s close cooperation with the EU in set-
ting up the SC and the SPO as a way to ‘bring Kosovo closer to full integration
in the European Union’. Likewise, in her reply, the EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs added that EULEX, in carrying out its mandate, ‘will contribute
to facilitating Kosovo’s progress towards further integration with the EU’.
Another difference between the EAC and the SC and the SPO lies in the
broader international legal context in which the latter came into existence.
One should consider, for instance: that the SC and the SPO have been created
as a response to the unsuccessful prior efforts (by the ICTY, the UNMIK
Regulation 64/2000 Panels and EULEX) to prosecute the offences under their
jurisdiction;48 that Kosovo was placed under international administration
after the end of the conflict (UNMIK operated from 1999 until 2008, while the
International Steering Group/International Civilian Office from 2008 until
2012); and that various international entities were involved in the determin-
ation of Kosovo’s final status (the UN, the International Court of Justice and
the CoE).
In this regard, one should notice that the pursuit of criminal justice in
Kosovo has been increasingly ‘regionalized’ over the years. At the beginning,
the UN exercised criminal jurisdiction through UNMIK, which, in 2000
46 On this process, its origins, contents and implications, see E. Milano, Formazione dello Stato e
processi di State-building nel diritto internazionale. Kosovo1999-2013 (Editoriale scientifica, 2013).
47 See A.L. Capussela, State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans (I.
B. Tauris, 2015).
48 The CoE Report followed the ‘revelations of the former Prosecutor at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), who alleged that serious crimes had been com-
mitted during the conflict in Kosovo’ (supra note 6, x 1) by KLA militia leaders against
Serbians and Albanian Kosovars, including imprisonment in secret detention centres, in-
human and degrading treatment, forced disappearance (xx 3, 5). The Report stressed that ‘the
international authorities in charge of the region did not consider it necessary to conduct a de-
tailed examination of these circumstances, or did so incompletely and superficially’ (x 6). In
particular, the ‘ICTY, which had started to conduct an initial examination on the spot to estab-
lish the existence of traces of possible organ trafficking, dropped the investigation’ (x 8). After
the conflict ended, the ‘international organisations in place in Kosovo [i.e., UNMIK] favoured a
pragmatic political approach, taking the view that they needed to promote short-term stability
at any price’ (x 10). As a result, ‘EULEX . . . inherited a difficult and sensitive situation, particu-
larly in the sphere of combating serious crime . . . . Consequently, a large number of crimes
may well continue to go unpunished’ (x11).
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established mixed panels and teams composed of a majority of foreign judges
and prosecutors to deal with serious offences in compliance with due process
rights (UNMIK Regulation 64/2000 Panels). After the February 2008 declar-
ation of independence, the EU replaced the UN as international civil presence
in Kosovo. The EU Council dispatched EULEX, a civilian mission under the EU
Common Security and Defence Policy aimed at monitoring, advising and pro-
viding technical assistance to local authorities and law enforcement agencies
in the rule of law area (police, justice and customs), including with regard to
the prosecution of international and transborder crimes connected to the
conflict.49
At the end of 2008, UNMIK began deferring cases to EULEX. One of EULEX’s
essential objectives was to develop an independent and impartial multi-ethnic
justice system, able to conduct fair trials according to European best practices.
Foreign judges and prosecutors were assigned to criminal cases by EULEX.
These judges and prosecutors sat, together with their local counterparts, on
mixed panels and boards, to guarantee that cases of war crimes, terrorism,
organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes
and other serious crimes were properly investigated, prosecuted and adjudi-
cated.50 Since Kosovo’s independence, cases have been tried before panels led
by an EULEX judge and composed of other EULEX and local judges.51 They
have received from UNMIK hundreds of cases, at various stages of the proceed-
ings. EULEX identified as a priority the prosecution of war crimes perpetrated
during the 1998^1999 conflict.
The SC and the SPO fit in this process of ‘regionalization’ driven by the EU
and are closely connected, in terms of staff management, with EULEX. The
question thus arises whether they might have the same outcome and, in such
an event, how to avoid it. However, development of this point is beyond the
scope of this inquiry.52 From a normative perspective, the circumstances
under which a judicial body actually achieves ç or does not achieve ç the
purpose for which it was created seems to have no bearing on its legal
categorization.
49 For an insight, see S. Williams, Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals: Selected
Jurisdictional Issues (Hart Publishing, 2012), at 88^90.
50 Art. 3(d) Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008, on the European Union Rule
of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, Official Journal of the European Union, L 42/92, 16
February 2008.
51 Law No. 03/L-053 of 13 March 2008, on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of
EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo (available online at www.kuvendikosoves.org, last
visited 3 November 2015); Law No. 03/L-052 of 13 March 2008, on the Special Prosecution
Office of the Republic of Kosovo (available online at www.kuvendikosoves.org, last visited 3
November 2015).
52 For a thorough analysis of EULEX rule of law-reforming task and its consequences for main-
taining peace and security in Kosovo, see T. Altwicker and N. Wieczorek, ‘Bridging the
Security Gap through EU Rule of Law Missions? Rule of Law Administration by EULEX’,
Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2015) 1^19 (available on line at www.jcsl.oxfordjournals.
org, last visited 25 November 2015).
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10. Concluding Observations: A‘Regional’ Mixed
Criminal Tribunal?
The SC and the SPO constitute a special temporary institution. Their establish-
ment was inspired by the experience gained during the last two decades in
some countries, which like Kosovo were recovering from serious crises. Unlike
in those countries, however, the UN did not participate in the creation and
functioning of these judicial bodies; rather, the EU, a regional organization,
did, as a measure of (late) state-building, and as a way to foster Kosovo’s pro-
gressive approach to EU membership. Kosovo housed the conflict in (and fol-
lowing) which the offences were perpetrated. In light of their internal
features and mandate, the SC and the SPO have the potential to positively influ-
ence national reconciliation and state-building processes. They might entail
long-term effects in Kosovo, at the normative and institutional levels. Their na-
tional origins bring them close to the society massacred by the crimes, impart-
ing a sense of local ownership to criminal proceedings for the atrocities
committed during the war in Kosovo.
Hence, from a functional perspective, the SC and the SPO resemble a mixed
criminal tribunal. The creation of new mixed tribunals is a feasible and useful
contribution to the reconstruction of judicial systems within countries which
have been torn by international crimes and other mass atrocities.53 One
should not rule out the possibility that such contribution might be undertaken
or promoted by a regional organization, rather than by the UN. Therefore,
should one be willing to categorize them, the SC and the SPO ç given their re-
gional background ç could be considered as institutional variations on
the theme of mixed criminal tribunals. They are not linked to ‘classic’ UN
post-conflict peacebuilding, but rather to EU state-building activities. In this
sense, they seem to be the first example of what perhaps might be called a
‘regional’ mixed criminal tribunal.
53 On this point see Romano, supra note 19, at 75.
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